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Abstract. We answer affirmatively a conjecture of J.A. Bergstra et al. [l] showing 
input-output correctness theories determine program equivalence over Peano axioms. 
that the 
We answer affirmatively a conjecture raised in [l] about program equivalence. 
For the sake of completeness, we repeat here some definitions, for the undefined 
ones see [l]. All the formulas and programs are supposed to belong to the Peano 
signature. 
The set of natural numbers is denoted by N. 
Let A be an arbitrary Peano model, and P be a program. P(a) denotes the 
output of P applying to the input a E A” 8s well as thie computation itself. P(a )i 
denotes that the computation converges, P(a jf that it diverges. For every k E N, 
the formula COMPp,k (a) expresses the fact that P applying to a = (al, . . . ,a,) E A" 
halts after exactly k steps; COMP& a) means that if P starts from a E A." then it 
halts after exactly I EA steps (this I can be a non standard element of dA, too). 
Finally, the (Peano) polynomial OUTp,k (a) coincides writh the output P(a) of P for 
arguments atisfying C0MPp.k (a). 
For the formulas ty = .cy (x) and p = p(x, y), A ~{cY}P{~) if and only if, for all 
a E A” and k E N, A t= Q ‘a) A COMPp,k (a) implies A @(a9 0UTp.k (a)). The input- 
output partial correctness theory of P, written I/O-PC(P), is the set of all pairs 
(cu, /3), for which R l={a}P{P} in every Pean’o model A. 
The programs P and Q are equivalent, written P= C?, if in every model A of 
the Peano axioms, for all a E A” either P@)i and Q(a)4 and P(a) = Q(a ), 0~ both 
PWT and Q(a)?. 
eoren For any arithmetic programs P, C? 
I/O-pC(,P) = I/O-PC(Q) inzplie,T P = Q. 
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Yroof. Suppose F’+ CZ, we prove that II/:>-PCl(P) f I/O-PC(Q). 
C’ase 1. There is a model A of PA and iz E An such that P(n ) and Q(Q) ccsnvxges 
but P(d) # Q(a). Let k, I E N SO that 
Pn this case let 
a (x) = ~ohfP~,~ (x) A COMPQlb), 
First we claim that (IY, fi) E I/O-PC(P). Indeeld, if B is a model of PA and for some 
bd?“, Bi=cu(b), then P(b)i and Q(b)&, in fact iP(k))l = k and /Q(b)! == Z9 and, of 
course, P(b) = CkU’l”pSk (b), as was required. 
On the other hand, ((Y, p) ti: I/O-PC(Q) because in 
A, Q(a)*!., A l=a ~(a), and Q(a) # OUTp,k(a). 
Therefore, we have P =w Q. 
Case 2. I[n somt: model A of PA, there is an a E A”’ 
(say). Then let blP(a)l = k, and we know that 
the above mentioned model 
such that P(a)i while Q( u jp 
A J= -I COMPQ (l, a ) for every 2 E F+L 
We distinguish <three more subcases. 
Cast? 2.1. Kn some model 13 of PA there is an element b E B” such that 
@t=COMPp,k(b) h Vy lCOMP&, b). 
Then (ar, p) E 1,0PC(Q) - J/‘O-PC(P) where 
cy (x) z= COMP p,k(Jrj A vy --COMP&y, X), 
Indeed, if C b a (c) for some model C of PA and elernent c E C”, then c + 
-SOlUP& c) for every rl E: N, therefore Q(c)?, and so (a,&) E I/O-PC@). On 
the other hand,, there is a model B of PA and b E B” such that B I= cu (b) (see above) 
and then P(b)& that is (cy, @I 12’ I/O-PC(p). 
Therefore wa: may assume that this is not the case, and by Giidel’s corqleteness 
theorem, we h2ve 
PA t-- COMPRk(x)+ 3y COMP&, x). 
Case 2.2. In some model B of PA, 
B ~V~~XY~(COMP~,~(X) c\ COMP*(y, x)+ y 3 z), 
i.e. there are arbitrary long computations for the program Q. Denote this latter 
sentence by ‘11?, then Con(PA w {W)). Now, by Godel’s incompleteness theorem, 
e formula expressing this consistency is independent from PA v { !F}, therefore 
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if we put 
Q(x) = “X exceeds the Giidel number of a derivation which 
yields a contradiction from PA u (p}“, 
then Con(PA v ( W, 3x a(x)}), while C k PA u {V} implies C I= 1 @(I) for e very 
standard I E I% Now let 
ar(x)=COMPpqk(x) A3y(@(y) F, COMP&y, x)) A V, 
/3(x, y ) = false. 
Befzause PA u {V, 3y G(y)} is consistent, there is a model C of PA u {lu) anld an 
element c E C” for which C /=cu (c), and so (ar, p) E I/O-PC(Q) - I/O-PC(P). 
C.se 2.3. Not the cases above, therefore 
PA t- 3tYxVy(COMP~,&) A COMPo(y, x)+ y s 2). 
By the induction axiom, there is a least element z with this property, and let 19(z) 
be the formula expressing this fact, in ‘particular PA t- 3!z e(z), and con(P’A 1 , 
(1 e(i): 2 E N}) because we are in Case 2 and the program Q diverges in some model 
of F.A. Let 0(x) be the formula the existence of which is stated in the lemma 
be! $w. Put 
@(x, y) =false. 
The assertion a(x) states that the length of the computation of Q is maximal (recall 
the meaning of 6), and this length does not satisfy the formula @. Since for any 
model C of PA, and for any standard natural number k N, Ck G(Z), if C ka(c) 
for some c E C” then Q(c) diverges (the length of the computation is necessarily 
non standard). Therefore (CW, P)E I/O-PC(Q). On the other hand, Con(PAu 
{3y@(y) A l@(y))}). Let B be a model of this theory, and b E B” be such tha,t 
BU(b)iil@(b). 
This b is non standard, especially b # 0. Therefore there exists an a E B” sulch that 
B bar (a) (otherwise the maximal ength of the computations would be zero:), With 
this% a E B”, P(a) converges which means (cu, p)a I/O-PC(P). This proves the 
the orem. U 
VVhat has remained is to prove the following lemma. 
Le:mrma. Suppose O(x) is a Peano formula such that PA I- 3!x 9(x) and Conl:PA u 
(1 @(I): 1 E IV}). Then there exists a Peano formula G(x) such that PA I- @l(l) for 
ewry I E N and 
Con(PAu{3y(@(y) EI +j(y)))). 
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Proof. Define tlhs: function 6 by ((0) = 2, [(x + 1) = !:(x)? In an arbitrary model 
of PA we denolte: by lul ” the (unique) element determined by 8, and by JT~ the 
maximal element. for whipzh e(nn) < m*. The theory T = PA u {16(r): I E N} is recur- 
sively enumerable, consistent, h,erefore if we: put 
P(#) 12: “there is no derivation from 1’ with Gijdlel number .S 1, yielding a 
contradiction”‘, 
then oby-iousll y PA I=- V(I) for every I E N. If moreover Con(PAu 
{$,@(u) A I q'f y))}) then we am done. If not, i.e. 
then work as follows. Putting it into words, (1) means that if we can derive a 
contrddiction f~:~om T then the Giidel number of this derivation must exceed m *. 
In the sequel we: identify the: derivations with their G6del numbers, and, for example, 
we say that there: exrsts uo re!fratation s:m* from the theory T. 
Enumerate &lil the iormlrlas with one frke variable of the Peano signature in such 
a way that the starldard formu& come first; and let @ be the ith one. Define the 
sets Hi for i c PP~ as follows. Start with Ho = p), and if Hi is defined for some i ( m - 1, 
let Hi++l =Hi u I[@&)} if there is no refutation <t(m - i - 1) from the theory T u Hi u 
{@I}; otherwise I/et Hi+1 = Hi ‘U { 1 @i(i)}. 
We claim that for every e’ < ~:1, no refutation <Q(m - i) exists from T u Hi. 
Indeed, it ie; true for i = 0, and if it is true for some i (: m - 1, but does not 
hold for i-t 1, then there is a refutation <e(rn -i - 1) from T u Hi u {@i(i)}, 
and there is a refutation <l(na --P - 1) from T’ V Hi U {l&(i)}, tO0. Putting 
together these: refutations, we get a refutation from ‘r u Hi with G6del number 
<&(m -i - I\fi(‘~-i-l) = Let gz(x) bi 
: 
t heformu:r; i),. ia zontradictio3. 
“ <: rn .-+ G,.(x)& Hx+l” .This is clearly a standard formula, 
and it occurs slsmewhere inthle sequence @i with a standard index, say Q(X) = @l(x) 
with I E N. 
If in some model A of T, A I= @i(Z), then, by the definition of @I, A I= @l(Z) G f&+1, 
and so there is no sfandani refutation from the theory T u HI u{l C&(Z)}, i.e. 
Con( T u {W&(I))). Similarly, i.f 111 k -1 @l(Z), then we can deduce Con( T u {@l(l)}). 
It means that th,e formula @+(1:1 is independent of T. 
Let 4. be a.11 arbitrary model of T, ar3 investigate the construction of the sets 
Hi for standard i E IN. We know that one cannot derive (by standard deril.ration) a
coahtradiction i ram T u Hi. Therefore T u Hi is consistent. If @i(i) ti Hi+1 then there 
exists a refutz” tiioni <,f(m -i) <I m” from the theory T u Hi u {@i(i))*. If, in spite of 
tl‘%, the theory ‘2’ w Hi \J {[@i(d)} is ‘consistent, hen the formula . 
“the K exists no refut’ation <:x from the theory T u Hi u {@i(i)}” 
satisfies the rr:quirements of t’he lemma. Therefore we may assume that T u Hi u 
{@i(i)} is contrac%ory, i.e. there exists a standard refutation, too. Because the 
model A ws15 chosen arbitrarily, this means that in any model -4 of T, the sets Hi 
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consist of the same formulas (at least for standard indices), especially, either in 
every model A of T, A I= d+(I) E Hl+l or in every model A t= @l(j) & Hl+l. But this 
implies that either T t- 1 @(I), or T I- @l(Z), which contradicts to the independency 
we got earlier. So the lemma is proved. El 
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